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Abstract
Resistance to socially desired reforms may arise from uncertainty about the consequences
of reforms at the individual level (Fernandez and Rodrik, 1991). Without a binding
commitment, a promise to compensate losers will not raise support for reforms due to a
credibility problem. This paper shows that voting simultaneously on several reforms may
solve the credibility problem. It is argued that the governmental agreement in the
Netherlands has served as a means to vote simultaneously on several reforms and has
helped breaking political deadlocks. Moreover, our model provides an explanation for
some perceived changes in the Dutch policy making process.
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11. Introduction
The motivation for this paper is the turn in Dutch politics in 1982. At the end of the
seventies and in the early eighties, the Netherlands faced some severe economic problems:
unemployment increased from 221 thousand to 559 thousand, as a share of national
income the budget deficit exceeded ten percent, implying an explosive path of government
debt, and government expenditures seemed uncontrollable. Moreover, there was a growing
concern about the adverse effects of the tax and social security system on efficiency. In
principle, there was consensus among policy makers that the economic problems required
major policy adjustments. Unfortunately, policy makers failed to reach agreement as to
what policy adjustments had to be made. Neither the central-right wing coalition governing
from 1978 to 1981 nor the central-left wing coalition in office in 1981-1982, were able to
design policy reforms which gained majority support in parliament.  
One of the possible causes of the political stalemate before 1982 is the Dutch party
system. Recent studies on political economy suggest that a fragmented party system, like
that of the Netherlands, makes legislative support difficult to mobilize (cf. Alesina and
Drazen, 1991, and  Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini, 1991).
However, in 1982 the political deadlock was broken. The coalition government
consisting of conservatives (VVD) and the christian democrats (CDA) started to implement
a policy program laid down in a “governmental agreement”. This governmental agreement
described in detail time paths of the budget deficit and the tax burden over the
administration’s term. In addition, it described various adjustment programs and how the
government would respond to unanticipated events. The content of this governmental
agreement deviated from former ones. Before 1982, the governmental agreements
described the general objectives of the government and were less precise on policies. 
Since 1982, the governmental agreement has played an important role in the coalition
formation process. It has changed Dutch policy making in a number of respects. First,
ministers have committed themselves to implementing the policies described in the
agreement. Second, the agreements have functioned as a voting guide in parliament for the
political parties joining the coalition. This has increased party discipline considerably.
Since 1982, the main opposition party has usually voted against the reforms proposed by
the government, while reforms have been supported by all members of the coalition
2parties. Third, once in office, political parties seem to have abandoned their traditional
ideological positions. The labour party (PvdA) provides an interesting example. In the
early nineties, under a PvdA-CDA government a proposal for a major reform of the social
security system was approved by CDA and PvdA in parliament, despite determined
opposition of the PvdA to earlier, less far-stretched, reforms under a VVD-CDA
government. Finally, after 1982 fluctuations in electoral support to parties have become
more volatile. Moreover, data on vote intentions reveal mid-term cycles after 1982 while
such cycles are not present before 1982.
The objective of this paper is twofold. First, we analyze the potential role of
governmental agreements in breaking political deadlocks, and second, we argue that the
increased role of  governmental agreements in Dutch politics may help explain the changes
in the Dutch policy making process mentioned above.
Our analysis builds on Fernandez and Rodrik (1991), who show that resistance to
socially desired reforms may arise from uncertainty about the consequences of reforms at
the individual level. Individual-specific uncertainty may make that ex ante a majority
expects to lose from a reform, and hence votes against it, while ex post, a majority would
benefit from implementing the reform. We advance a simple model in which various types
of reforms exist, none of which gain majority support due to individual-specific uncertainty
about their distributive consequences. We will argue that without a binding commitment,
compensation of the losers by the winners through direct side payments does not persuade
the potential losers to support the reform, because of a credibility problem. Once the
reform is implemented and the winners and losers are known, there is no incentive any
more for the majority to compensate the losers. One way to avoid this problem is to
compensate losers in the form of a complementary reform. If both reforms are supported
by a majority ex post, bundling reforms increases the chances of breaking political
deadlocks. In our model, the governmental agreement serves as a means of credibly
combining various types of reforms. The analysis also provides insight into how a package
of reforms should be designed. In particular, we show that on aggregate the package of
reforms must yield a positive sum to the constituents of the coalition parties. Hence,
adopting complementary projects in a governmental agreement renders projects politically
feasible for which direct side payments would be a solution if they were credible.
Though this paper deals with the Netherlands, we believe that its scope is much broader.
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Governmental agreements are a typical feature of the government formation process in
western multiparty democracies (cf. Van Roozendaal, 1996). However, the role of
governmental agreements has been largely remained unstudied. Our results are also, or
perhaps particularly, relevant for the design of adjustment programs in developing
countries and formerly socialist countries. Like in the Netherlands before 1982, in these
countries adjustment programs, though socially desired in the long-run, are often politically
difficult to launch. Success of implementing adjustment programs heavily relies on their
credibility and the ability of the government to mobilize political support (Haggard and
Webb, 1993, and Rodrik, 1996). Both elements play an essential role in our analysis.
This paper is organised as follows. The next section reviews the Fernandez-Rodrik
argument within the framework of a three party system. Section 3 formally describes the
characteristics of welfare-enhancing projects on which political stalemate may be reached.
Next we analyse in section 4 the potential role of the governmental agreement in breaking
political deadlocks. Section 5 examines how the increased role of the governmental
agreement might have affected government support of the electorate and provides some
empirical evidence based on poll data on voter behaviour. Finally, section 6 offers some
concluding remarks.
 
2. The Fernandez-Rodrik Argument
Our analysis of the potential role of governmental agreements in breaking political
deadlocks builds on Fernandez and Rodrik (1991). They address the question of why
governments sometimes fail to adopt policies that are generally seen as efficiency-
enhancing. Fernandez and Rodrik provide an explanation for this puzzle, which relies on
uncertainty concerning the identity of winners and losers from reform. The key idea behind
their explanation can be illustrated with the following example.
Suppose a three party system ( and O). The parties  and  form a
coalition government. Both  and  have 40 percent of the seats in parliament, w.
Party O has the remaining 20 percent of the seats, (1-2w). Parliament is assumed to be a
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G2
G1
G2
pB (1 p)L 0.5
4
mirror of the electorate. The government is considering putting forward a proposal to
parliament to adopt a certain project. The project has the following distributional effects: 1.
The project yields a certain benefit of 10 (B = 10) to the constituents of party ; 2. The
project yields a certain loss of 5 (L = 5) to the constituents of party O; 3. The constituents
of party  do not know whether they will end up being losers or winners. Each citizen
who traditionally votes for party  faces a probability of 0.3 (p) gaining 10, and a
probability of 0.7 (1-p) losing 5.
What will parliament decide under majority rule? Assuming risk neutrality, voting
behaviour in parliament depends on members’ expected net gain (ENG).  Obviously, all
members of party  support the proposal of undertaking the project, while all members
of party O vote against the project. The ENG of members of party  is negative
[ ]. Therefore, a majority of parliament prefers the status quo to
adoption of the project, and the project is rejected by parliament. 
However, if the project were undertaken, a majority of the electorate (40+0.3*40=52 per
cent) would benefit from the project. Furthermore note that in our example the project is
globally efficient (aggregate benefits exceed aggregate costs). This suggests that the
winners of the project may persuade the losers of the project by promising side-payments.
However, these side payments raise a credibility problem. Once the project is undertaken,
there is no incentive for the winners anymore to compensate the losers. 
3. Four Types of Projects 
In the above example, individual specific uncertainty creates a gap between ex ante and ex
post support for a project. It is evident that whether or not a project gets ex ante and/or ex
post majority support depends on the number of seats parties have in parliament
pB (1 p)L > 0, implying L
B
< p
1 p
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     In the Netherlands, the Christian Democratic Party (CDA) and the Labour Party1
(PvdA) have approximately had the same number of seats in parliament. Thus our calcula-
tions seem most relevant for CDA-PvdA coalitions. However, since recently, the liberal
party (VVD) is of roughly the same size as the CDA and the PvdA.
     Of course these assumptions are not without loss of generality. However, relaxing them2
makes the results less transparent, while the spirit of the results remains unaffected.
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(  and o), the magnitude of the benefits (B) and losses (L), and the probabilities
that individuals end up being winners (p) or losers (1-p). In this section, we examine how
ex ante and ex post support depend on these parameters (see also Pinto Barbosa, 1994). In
doing this, we make the following assumptions. As in the example, we assume that there
are three parties, of which  and  have an equal share of seats in parliament, w,
and form a majority coalition, 2w > ½.  Moreover, we assume that only the constituents of1
party  are uncertain about winning or losing from the project, while the constituents
of party  are certain winners and those of party O are certain losers.2
Ex ante support. Because the project benefits the constituents of  and hurts the
constituents of the opposition party, ex ante support for the project solely depends on
support of the members of party . Each member of parliament belonging to party
 supports the project if his ENG>0. Thus the condition for ex ante support is:
Equation (1) shows that higher values of  p and lower values of  increase the chance
w pw > ½
G1 G2
L
B
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(2).
of  ex ante support. Note that ex ante support is independent of w.
Ex post support. Ex post support is equal to the number of citizens ending up winning
from the project relative to the number of citizens ending up losing from the project. All
constituents of party  and proportion p of of the constituents of party  will end
up winning from the project. Thus the condition for ex post majority support is given by:
Clearly, ex post support depends positively on both w and p. Note that  does not affect
ex post support.
Table 1: Projects distinguished by ex ante and ex post majority support
Majority support ex ante No majority support ex ante
(condition (1) satisfied) (condition (1) not satisfied)
Majority support ex post Projects of the first type: Projects of the fourth type:
(condition (2) satisfied) Projects benefiting a Projects benefiting a
majority that will be majority that will not be
implemented. implemented.
No majority support ex post Projects of the third type: Projects of the second type:
(condition (2) not satisfied) Projects hurting a majority Projects hurting a majority
that may be implemented, that will not be
but will subsequently be implemented.
repealed.
With equation (1) and (2) we can distinguish four types of projects, which are presented
in Table 1. First, there are projects which are approved by parliament (ex ante support),
and benefit a majority of citizens (ex post support). Second, there are projects for which
neither ex ante support nor ex post support exists. Probably these two types of projects are
most common, but for the purposes of the present paper they are least interesting. Third,
there are projects which get majority support ex ante, but which hurt the majority of the
people. This type of projects may be implemented, but a proposal to repeal them will be
7approved by parliament. Fourthly, there are projects which do not get majority support, but
if implemented would benefit the majority of people. 
At the end of the seventies and in the early eighties, there was a broad consensus in the
Netherlands that structural adjustments were required. Sticking to a predetermined path of
the budget deficit and the tax burden, reforms in the social security system and health care
system, a general tax reform, and a stronger environmental policy were all regarded as
necessary, but before 1982 proposals in these areas could not count on majority support in
parliament. Since most of these policy adjustments have important distributional effects
which are subject to individual specific uncertainty, we believe that many of them belong
to the fourth type of projects discussed above. The next section describes how we believe
these political deadlocks were broken after 1982.
4. The governmental agreement as a means of breaking political deadlocks
As discussed in the introduction, since 1982 governmental agreements have played an
important role in Dutch politics. Basically, a governmental agreement is a document drawn
up by the political parties forming the coalition government. It describes in detail the
coalition parties’ intentions as to future policies. Governmental agreements are determined
before ministers are appointed. By accepting office, ministers commit themselves to
carrying out the plans laid down in the governmental agreement. For the representatives
affiliated with the coalition parties, the governmental agreement has almost developed into
the eleventh commandment. Members of parliament, who belong to the political parties
joining the coalition, use the governmental agreement as a binding voting guide. 
Obviously, there are costs attached to such a strong commitment to policy plans. Most
importantly, it reduces the ability of the government to react to unforeseen events. The
question arises why policy makers incur these costs. In this section, we argue that
governmental agreements have enabled policy makers to undertake a set of projects, which
individually could not count on majority support, but which were regarded as welfare
enhancing (project IV in Table 1). The idea behind our argument is simple. As discussed in
the previous sections, an undesirable bias towards the status quo may exist as the result of
a time consistency problem. Promises to compensate losers after the project is undertaken
are not credible. A governmental agreement may solve this credibility problem by adopting
L
B
< 1 p
1 p
G1
G2
G1 (G2)
G1 G2
G1 G2 B pB (1 p)L
     Recall that the governmental agreement serves as a binding voting guide for the mem-3
bers of the coalition parties in parliament.
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a complementary project, which also lacks majority support ex ante, but would get
majority support ex post if it were undertaken.
To formalise the argument, suppose that there are two projects. For each individual
project  condition (1) is violated but condition (2) is satisfied. Thus each project will be
rejected by parliament. The characteristics (L, B, and p) of the projects are as in section 2.
The projects differ in that project 1 benefits the constituents of party  with certainty,
while project 2 benefits the constituents of party  with certainty. The constituents of
party   are uncertain about ending up as winners or losers when project 2 (1) is
undertaken.
Party  and  form a majority coalition government. The governmental
agreement enables the coalition parties to submit the two projects for approval by
parliament simultaneously.  Does parliament approve the governmental agreement? The3
answer to this question depends on both ex ante and ex post evaluation of the plans. 
Let us first consider ex ante approval. Since the two projects are assumed to be
symmetric (or perfectly complementary), the ENG from the set of projects is equal for all
constituents of party  and : . Therefore, the two parties
support the governmental agreement if:
Clearly, condition (3) is less restrictive than (1). Hence, ex ante, a set of two
complementary projects is more likely supported than a single project. From (3) it is easy
L
B
< (n 1) (n 1)p
(n 1) (n 1)p
L
B
< 1
L
B
> 1
½(n 1) G1 ½(n 1)
G2
G2
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to see that if , a set of two projects always gets ex ante majority support. The
reason for this is that in those cases, all constituents affiliated with the coalition parties will
certainly gain from undertaking the two projects, the minimum gain being B - L. If
, p must be large enough in order to obtain majority support for the set. Note that
condition (3) implies that a set of two projects only obtains majority support if it yields a
positive sum on aggregate to the constituents of the coalition parties. Thus, adopting
complementary projects in a governmental agreement renders projects politically feasible
for which direct side payments would be a solution if they were credible.
The condition for ex ante majority support can also be derived for n complementary
projects. First suppose that the governmental agreement includes an even number of
complementary projects. If both parties benefit with certainty from an equal number of
projects, then the condition for ex ante majority support is the same as (3). The reason for
this is that doubling the number of projects doubles the ENG without affecting its sign (a
proof is provided in the appendix). Next suppose an uneven number of projects, with
 projects benefiting with certainty  constituents, and  projects
benefiting with certainty  constituents. Analogous to the case of one project, ex ante
majority support now solely depends on support of the constituents of party . The
appendix proves that the condition for ex ante majority support is given by:
Equation (4) shows that the higher the number of projects, n, the less restrictive is the
condition for ex ante majority support. Furthermore note that (4) is more restrictive
(regardless of n) than (3), which implies that if we add a project to a governmental
L
B
< 1 G1 G2
     In principle, the coalition parties may also use the governmental agreement to obtain4
majority support for projects of the second type. However, because these type of projects
do not get ex post majority support, they are likely to be repealed by a next coalition
government. In fact, as to projects of the second type, the well known problem of logrol-
ling arises (see Mueller, 1989, p. 82-87).
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agreement including an even number of reforms, the probability of ex ante majority
support declines. Only if n goes to infinity, (4) reduces to (3). In essence (3) and (4)
indicate that the more equally the net expected gains from a set of projects are distributed
among the coalition parties, the higher are the chances of ex ante majority support. 
Now consider the question whether the governmental agreement and its components
obtain ex post majority support. Ex post majority support is important for two reasons.
Firstly, without ex post majority support a proposal to repeal the projects will be approved
by parliament. Parliament is likely to prefer the status quo to a cycle status quo - policy
innovations - status quo (cf. Fernandez and Rodrik, 1991, p. 1154). Thus lack of ex post
majority support jeopardises ex ante majority support. Secondly, ex post majority support
for any single project and any combination of projects is required to render the
governmental agreement time consistent. If a complementary project persuades a political
party to support the governmental agreement, that party must be confident that the project
is not repealed by any other future coalition government. Otherwise, the complementary
project does not compensate losses from other projects. This is why we have not allowed
the governmental agreement to include projects other than projects of the fourth type
(Table 1). Projects of the first type are not compensating, because if they are proposed they
are undertaken anyway. The second type of projects is not relevant, while the third type of
projects does not compensate, because they will be repealed after implementation (or by a
new government).4
Let us start with determining the condition for ex post majority support for the
governmental agreement if n=2. Since the only relevant projects in a governmental
agreement are projects of the fourth type, individually each project obtains majority
support ex post. The question remains whether a majority in parliament eventually benefits
from undertaking two complementary projects. Clearly, if , all  and 
2w > ½ if L
B
< 1
2pw > ½ if L
B
> 1
G1 G2
2w > ½ L
B
> 1
G1 G2
L
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     Recall, however, that ex post majority support for each individual project is still requi-5
red. Hence, condition (2) must be satisfied.
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(5a)
(5b).
constituents eventually benefit from undertaking the projects, as each constituent’s
minimum gain equals B - L (recall that together  and  form a majority in
parliament, ). If , ex post majority support is not guaranteed. Then, only
a fraction p of both  and  constituents eventually benefits from the two projects.
Thus for n=2, the condition for ex post majority support is:
It is easy to see that (5a) is less restrictive than (2), while (5b) is more restrictive than (2).
Equation (5a) implies that if , ex post majority support for the bundle of two
projects is guaranteed.  Equation (5b) implies that a combination of two projects with5
 may lack ex post majority support, although each project individually receives ex
post majority support. To put it differently, two projects of the fourth type may together
form a project of the third type. In such a case, the governmental agreement does not solve
the time consistency problem, so that the political deadlock is not broken.
If the governmental agreement contains more than two projects, the same kinds of
L
B
L
B
> n
L
B
L
B
< 1
L
B
> 1
L
B
< 1
     It can even be shown that for projects with a high  ( ), the probability of6
ex post majority support declines as the number of projects included (n) increases.
Intuitively, given that the probabilities to gain from an individual project are independent,
it holds that the larger the number of projects included, the higher the chance of losing
from at least one project. With high values of , losing from one project means ending
up as a net loser from the bundle of projects. Hence, in these cases it holds that the larger
the number of projects included, the larger the proportion of the population ending up as
net losers. Details of the algebra are available from the authors.
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results arise. Ex post majority support is still guaranteed if . Increasing the number
of projects included does not broaden the scope for succesfully implementing projects with
 by means of the governmental agreement. With more than two projects included,
condition (5b) must still be satisfied in order to render the governmental agreement time
consistent. Hence, if projects do not satisfy condition (5b), the political deadlock is not
broken, even if a large number of projects are included in the governmental agreement.6
In summary, in this section we have shown that governmental agreements may help to
break political deadlocks. A governmental agreement which combines complementary
projects with  will be approved by parliament, and will not be repealed after
implementation. This result is consistent with the empirical finding reported in studies on
reforms in developing countries and former socialistic countries that compensation in the
form of complementary reforms increases the chances of successful reform (Williamson
and Haggard, 1994). Furthermore, our analysis has pointed out that the more equal the net
L
B
> 1.
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expected gains are distributed among the constituents of the coalition parties, the sooner
the governmental agreement obtains ex ante support. Finally, we have found that
governmental agreements are less useful for breaking political deadlocks if Then
a governmental agreement increases ex ante support, but decreases ex post support.
As discussed in the introduction, since 1982 the policy making process in The
Netherlands has changed in several respects. Some of these changes can be explained by
the increased role of the governmental agreement. From the above analysis it emerges that
parties’ commitment to adopting a set of projects requires party discipline, and that
ministers commit themselves to carrying out the plans described in the governmental
agreement. A coalition party may uniformly vote for projects from which its constituents
expect to suffer in the expectation that projects from which they benefit are supported by
the other coalition party. This is also the reason why after 1982, voting behaviour in
parliament depends heavily on whether members belong to an opposition party or to a
party joining the coalition. In opposition there is no reason why a party would support a
project hurting its constituents, while as a coalition party, it realizes that voting for projects
hurting its constituents is the price of obtaining support for projects benefiting its
constituents.
5. Governmental agreements and voters 
In the previous sections, we have examined how governmental agreements have enabled
administrations to obtain majority support for undertaking projects of the fourth type. In
this section, we examine the consequences of implementation of a set of projects of the
fourth type for government support of the electorate.
In economic models of voter behaviour, people make vote choices by estimating what
their expected utility will be under alternative incumbencies. Economic models differ in
their assumptions as to how expectations are formed. Broadly, two approaches can be
distinguished. In the first approach, voters base their expectations on what administrations
say they will do (prospective evaluations). In the context of the present paper, this
L
B
< 1
     The results obtained below are qualitatively the same in case of three projects. If more7
than three projects are included, the same results may arise, depending on the precise
timing of the consequences becoming visible.
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approach implies that the governmental agreement is an important document, as it
describes in detail the policies the administration intends to implement. In the second
approach, voters form expectations on the basis of the past (economic) performance under
the administration. The idea behind this approach is that the performance contains
information about the competence of the administration. This approach has led to the
retrospective voter model, in which election outcomes depend on how well citizens have
fared under a given administration (see e.g. Ferejohn, 1986).
In principle, the two approaches to voter behaviour are not mutually exclusive (cf.
Swank, 1996). There is no reason that in forming expectations voters would only rely on
policy plans or would only consider the performance of a given administration. However,
at the beginning of an administration’s term, when the administration has not yet put a
stamp on policy, prospective evaluations are likely to dominate retrospective evaluations.
For little information about the record of the administration is then available. As time
elapses, more information becomes available about the consequences of the
administration’s policies, and retrospective evaluations become more important. At the end
of the administration’s term, when all plans are carried out, retrospective evaluations are
likely to dominate prospective evaluations.
To model how governmental agreements affect government support, we make the
following assumptions. First, we assume that the governmental agreement includes two
complementary projects of the fourth type with .  Next, we assume that the7
consequences of the first project become visible in the middle of the administration’s term,
and that the consequences of the second project become visible at the end of the
administration’s term. This difference in timing may result from the fact that the first
project is earlier undertaken than the second project. Alternatively, the consequences of the
govsupt (1 t)pop
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t tpop
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t
pop EAt
pop EPt
G1
G2 G2
     It is worth noting that the precise timing is not essential. What matters is that the8
consequences of the two projects do not become visible at exactly the same time.
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(6)
second project may take longer to unfold.  Furthermore, we assume that at the beginning of8
the administration’s term (t=0), voters are only concerned with the expected consequences
of the governmental agreement, so that government support equals ex ante support for the
bundle of two projects. In the middle of the administration’s term (t=½), voters evaluate
how they have fared under the first part of the administration’s term, and how they expect
to be affected by the second project. At the end of the admnistrations term (t=1), the only
thing that counts is whether the two projects have made voters better-off or worse-off. To
calculate government support (govsup) we use the following equation:
where t = {0, ½, 1},  is the proportion of voters expecting to benefit from the
(remaining) projects described in the governmental agreement, and  is the
proportion of voters having benefited from the project(s) adopted.
At the beginning of the administration’s term, all constituents of the coalition parties
expect to benefit and the constituents of the opposition party expect to suffer from carrying
out the governmental agreement. Thus at t=0, government support equals 2w. At t=1, all
constituents of the coalition parties have experienced that the implementation of the two
projects have made them better-off. Again government support equals 2w. At t=½,
government support has a retrospective and a prospective component. The constituents of
party have benefited from the adoption of the first project, but expect to suffer from
the consequences of the second project. In contrast, a proportion 1- p of  the constituents of
party has suffered from the first project, but all constituents of party expect to
benefit from the second project. Thus total ex ante support equals w, and total ex post
govsupt 1 time 2 time
2
3
govsupt
1 < 0 2 > 0.
1
2
3
     To determine cycles in government support, we need poll data on voter behaviour. Our9
data set (1971.1-1994.4) includes voters’ responses to the question: “If elections were held
today, which party would you vote for?”. We have restricted the analysis to administrati-
ons, which were in office for more than eight quarters.
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   (7)
support equals w + pw. Through (6) this implies that govsup = w + ½pw. Since w + ½pw <
2w, government support exhibits a mid-term cycle.
Does data on government support exhibit a mid-term cycle after 1982? To answer this
question, we have examined government support for two administrations being in office
before 1982, and for three administrations being in office after 1982.  A simple way of9
detecting a mid-term cycle is by estimating the following equation:
where is the proportion of voters who would vote for a coalition party if
elections were held in period t, and time is the number of quarters an administration is in
office. The occurence of a mid-term cycle requires at least that and 
Table 2 reports the estimates of (7).
Table 2: Estimation results of the equation for government support
Period 1973.2- 1978.1-81.2 1982.4-86.2 1986.3-89.2 1989.4-94.2
government 77.1 Central-right Central-right Central-right Central-left
Central-left
       -0.0031  -0.0036  -0.0266   -0.0219  -0.0349
 (0.008)   (0.005)   (0.003)    (0.003)   (0.004)
        0.0001  -0.0000   0.0015   0.0012   0.0011
 (0.0004)   (0.003)  (0.0002)  (0.0002)  (0.0002)
         0.477    0.381    0.427    0.410   0.598
 (0.030)   (0.013)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.018)
 minimum t      18       -       9       9      16
       R    0.028    0.570    0.805    0.942    0.9222
1 2
2
1 2
1 2
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Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. “Minimum t” is number of quarters after
installation of administration at which government support is at a minimum (calculated
from estimates). All estimates are based on NIPO data, Steinmetz Archiv XYX. 
The estimates of (7) for the two administrations before 1982 do not provide evidence for
the occurence of a mid-term cycle. The estimates of  and  are not significant at
conventional levels, and for the central-right administration  has the wrong sign. In
contrast, the estimates of  and  for the three administrations after 1982 provide
support for a mid-term cycle. All estimates of  and  have the proper signs and are
highly significant. The implied mid-term cycles for the two central-right administrations
almost exactly accord with the predictions of (6). In the first part of the administration’s
term, government support declines, reaching a minimum in the middle of the
administration’s term (ninth quarter). In the second part of the administration’s term,
government support rises. After four years, government support almost returns to its initial
level. The development of government support implied by the estimates for the central-left
administration (1989.4-94.2) is not fully consistent with the predictions of (6). Government
support declines after installation of the administration, but reaches its minimum just
before the end of the administration’s term. One reason that government support did not
rise at the second part of the administration’s term might be that a controversial adjustment
program (a reform of the social security system concerning the disabled) was implemented
at the end of the administration’s term.
Of course, the estimates presented in Table 2 do not allow a firm conclusion that
governmental agreements have induced a mid-term cycle in government support. The
limited number of administrations is one reason to refrain from such strong conclusion.
Moreover, there might be alternative explanations for the occurence of a mid-term cycle
after 1982. However, alternative existing explanations, such as offered by the political
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business cycle theory (Nordhaus, 1975) and the theory of divided government (Alesina and
Rosenthal, 1995, 1996), seem highly implausible, because they cannot explain why mid-
term cycles did not occur before 1982. Moreover, the theory of divided government is
implausible as it does not fit with Dutch political institutions. In contrast to voters in the
United States, in the Netherlands voters do not directly choose the executive. If the
political business cycle model were valid this would also imply cycles in economic
variables. However, no evidence exist for political business cycles in economic variables
(Alesina and Roubini, 1992).
Though the evidence for effects of governmental agreements on government support is
at best illustrative, it is worth to dwell on its implications. The above analysis indicates that
by carrying out a governmental agreement, government support may decline for some
time. When part of the consequences of the set of policies are known, some groups in
society experience that they have been hurt by the policies, while other groups have
nothing to gain from continuation of the coalition government. Only when all
consequences have become visible, all constituents of the coalition parties will recognize
that the implementation of the set of projects has made them better-off. For the three
administrations after 1982, the decline in government support was substantial. On average,
after nine quarters in office, government support was about 70 percent of initial
government support.  From this it follows that political parties will be reluctant to include
projects in a governmental agreement of which the benefits are reaped after the next
elections. For inclusion of such projects almost amounts to political suicide. Hence, the
extent to which a governmental agreement can be used as a means to break political
deadlocks might depend on government durability. Only if an administration expects to be
long enough in office to reap the benefits from a project, the administration is willing to
undertake it. Against this background, our results are in line with empirical studies which
suggest that short-lived governments have higher public debt than long-lived governments
(see for example Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini, 1991). In the three governmental
agreements after 1982, fiscal discipline played a very important role.
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6. Conclusions
Uncertainty about the consequences of reforms at the individual level may lead to political
deadlocks: reforms which would benefit a majority if they were implemented possibly do
not obtain majority support when voted on. In this paper we have shown that these political
deadlocks may be broken by voting on a package of reforms.
In the spirit of this result, we have examined the role of governmental agreements in the
Dutch policy making process after 1982. The governmental agreement is a document,
written before the administration takes office, which describes in detail the policy
adjustments the government intends to make. The coalition parties commit themselves to
carrying out the plans laid down in the governmental agreement. This makes that the
governmental agreement can be regarded as a means of credibly combining various
reforms.
Governmental agreements have altered Dutch policies in several respects. First of all,
they have enabled the government to get parliamentary support for many controversial
policy programs, and second, they have increased party discipline in parliament. Both
changes in Dutch politics are directly related to the purpose of governmental agreements:
breaking political deadlocks. Furthermore, we have argued that governmental agreements
have led to a cycle in government support of the electorate. At the beginning of an
administration’s term, a majority of the voters expects to benefit from carrying out the
plans laid down in the governmental agreement. When part of the program is carried out,
some groups in society experience that they have been hurt by the policies, while other
groups have nothing to gain from continuation of the coalition government. As a
consequence, government support declines. At the time the consequences of all projects
have become visible, most voters will recognize that they have benefited from the
governmental agreement. Then government support is high again. The cycle in government
support induced by governmental agreements has consequences for the type of projects
policy makers are willing to include in a governmental agreement. Provided that political
parties care about election outcomes, political parties are only willing to include projects in
the governmental agreements which consequences unfold within the administration’s term.
This leads to the conclusion that the extent to which governmental agreements are a
suitable means for breaking political deadlocks depends on government duration.
n
2
n
2
B n
2
(pB (1 p)L) > 0
n 1
2
n 1
2
n 1
2
B n 1
2
(pB (1 p)L) > 0
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Appendix: Proof of the condition for ex ante majority support for n>2
Parties calculate the ENG of the complete set and support it if ENG > 0. Considering a set
of n projects, with n being an even number, each party benefits with certainty from 
projects, while it is uncertain with respect to the other half of the projects included. Hence,
ex ante majority support for a set containing an even number of projects is obtained if:
(A.1)
which is equal to (3) in the text. If an uneven number of projects are included, ex ante
majority support relies on the sign of the ENG of the party benefiting with certainty from
 projects, while being uncertain with respect to  projects. Hence, a set
containing an uneven number of projects obtains majority support ex ante if:
(A.2)
which can be written as (4) in the text.
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